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concerns the determination of appeals under clause 278. The Court of Appeal may allow an appeal if the appellant satisfies the court that there is an error in the original sentence and that a different sentence should be imposed. (Originating court is defined in clause 3). Currently, section 568(4) of the Crimes Act 1958 requires the Court of Appeal to quash the sentence and substitute a different sentence if it thinks that "a different sentence should have been passed." On the face of it, this discretion is unfettered. In practice, however, it is firmly settled that a two-stage test applies: first, to assess whether the sentence imposed was attended by error and, only if such error was established, to re-sentence the appellant (see, for example, House v The Queen (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505). The Court of Appeal's discretion has also been held to be subject to three qualifiers. First, there is a strong presumption in favour of correctness, affirming the broad nature of the discretion vested in a sentencing judge. Secondly, even if there is no apparent error on the record, manifest excess itself may allow the Court of Appeal to presume error. Thirdly, an error as to the facts can be found on the basis of material not available to the sentencing judge if the interests of justice require such material to be considered. The restrictions are not apparent from the words of the current section. To rectify this, subclause (1) specifically requires the Court of Appeal to satisfy itself that there was an error in the original sentence and that a different sentence should be imposed. This is intended to embed the principles noted above into the statutory scheme. The issue of when the Court of Appeal will receive and consider additional evidence will continue to be governed by the principles and practices developed by the court. Subclause (3) provides that, if the Court of Appeal is considering imposing a more severe sentence than the sentence originally imposed, it must warn the appellant as early as possible during the hearing of that possibility. This requirement is new and is consistent with the recommendation of the Victorian Parliament Law Reform Committee that (in relation to de novo appeals to the County Court) a statutory warning should be given if the court is considering increasing a sentence on appeal, presumably to give the appellant the opportunity to abandon the appeal. See also discussion of clause 256.